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In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, economists are devoting much effort to evaluating the impact 
of terrorism on economic outcomes and understanding the channels through which the 
enhanced risk of large-scale terrorism induced by the 9/11 attacks may affect economic 
activity. A partial list of scholarly works in this rapidly growing literature is Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003, 2005), Becker and Murphy (2001), Becker and Rubinstein (2004), 
Berrebi and Klor (2006), Chen and Siems (2004), Enders and Sandler (1991, 1996), Enders, 
Sandler, and Parise (1992), Frey (2004), Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer (2004), Glaeser and 
Shapiro (2002), Pshisva and Suarez (2004), and Zussman, Zussman, and Nielsen (2006).  
The increase in the perceived level of terrorist risk induced by the 9/11 attacks has 
placed particularly large pressures on major Central Business Districts, such as New York, 
London, and Chicago, which are considered to be preferred targets of terrorist attacks 
because of their high population density, economic significance, and because they contain 
symbolic targets such as landmark buildings or government facilities. The susceptibility of 
Central Business Districts to large-scale terrorist attacks (as well as their vulnerability, as 
demonstrated by recent events) is particularly unsettling given the crucial role that Central 
Business Districts play in economic activity. Quite surprisingly, however, there is very little 
work available on the effects of terrorism on Central Business Districts. This article aims to 
fill that void. For this purpose, we use building-level data from downtown Chicago, one of 
the most significant Central Business Districts in the U.S., to investigate the economic impact 
of an increase in the perception of risk after 9/11.  
There are two main channels through which terrorism affects economic outcomes. 
First, terrorist attacks have a direct effect on the economy because they destroy productive 
capital (physical and human). Because the destruction caused by terrorist attacks represents 
only a small fraction of the total stock of productive capital, Becker and Murphy (2001) have 
argued that the relative importance of this effect is small in practice. Second, terrorism 
increases the level of fear and uncertainty, which may have large effects on the behavior of 
economic agents (see Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2005, and especially Becker and Rubinstein, 
2004). 
The Central Business District (CBD) of Chicago provides the perfect laboratory to 
investigate the effects of an increase in the perceived risk of terrorism on a major financial  
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center. The city of Chicago was not directly affected by the destruction of the 9/11 attacks. 
However, the 9/11 attacks induced a large increase in the perception of terrorist risk in the 
Chicago Central Business District, which includes the tallest building in the U.S. (Sears 
Tower) and other landmark buildings. The case of Chicago is, therefore, of particular 
interest, because it allows us to separate the direct impact of terrorist attacks on available 
office space (absent in Chicago following the 9/11 events) from the impact caused by an 
increased perception of terrorism threat in Central Business Districts after 9/11.  
A distinctive characteristic of this study is that it uses data disaggregated at the 
building level on a quarterly basis for a panel of Class A and Class B office buildings (as 
defined by CoStar Group, see below) in the downtown area of Chicago. To our knowledge, 
data analysis of the impact of terrorism on real estate markets has never been done at this 
breadth and scale.  
 To detect the impact of an increase in the perception of terrorist risk in Chicago as a 
result of 9/11, we compare the evolution of vacancy rates at the three main landmark 
buildings of Chicago (the Sears Tower, the Aon Center, and the Hancock Center) and other 
nearby office buildings within a “shadow” area of 0.3-mile around each landmark building to 
the evolution of vacancy rates of office buildings located outside the shadow areas of the 
three landmark buildings. We use panel data fixed-effects estimators to control for the 
presence of unmeasured characteristics of each individual building in our sample. Our dataset 
includes quarterly data for Class A and Class B office buildings in downtown Chicago during 
the period of 1996-2006.
1 We selected the Sears Tower, the Aon Center, and the Hancock 
Center as “anchor” buildings because of their landmark stature, which makes them preferred 
targets of terrorist attacks. We based our choice of a 0.3-mile radius for the shadow areas on 
the spread of the massive debris in New York City after the 9/11 attacks (Dermisi, 2006).  
Our results show that office vacancy rates increased in downtown Chicago in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks. Most importantly, office properties in the three main Chicago 
                                                 
1 Office buildings are classified as Class A because of their amenities, design, location, building efficiency, 
management quality and other property characteristics which make them unique in the market and highly 
desirable for tenants who are willing to pay the highest market rents. Buildings are classified as Class B if they 
have good management and maintenance but do not feature the special or innovative characteristics, or the 
highly efficient floor plates that are often found in Class A buildings. Other “no-frills” lower-quality buildings 
are classified as Class C in the CoStar database. Class C buildings are appealing to a tenants' base with lower 
quality demands and more severe budgetary constraints than those who lease Class A or Class B properties. The 
exact CoStar definitions of Class A, B, and C are included in Appendix A.  
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landmark buildings and the surrounding areas experienced more severe increases in vacancy 
rates than office properties not located in the vicinities of landmark buildings. These results 
suggest that the higher perceived level of terrorist risk in Chicago after 9/11 induced 
centrifugal forces powerful enough to counteract the effects of agglomeration economies and 
knowledge spillovers. This is particularly disturbing given the crucial role of Central 
Business Districts in exploiting agglomeration economies and knowledge spillovers (Glaeser 
et al, 1992).  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
impact of terrorism in cities. Section 3 describes in detail our dataset and methodology. 
Section 4 presents and discusses our empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Terrorism in Cities 
Long before the events of 9/11, terrorism had inflicted a large number of human losses and 
severe physical destruction in major urban centers around the world, including London, 
Istanbul, and Jerusalem. As Savitch and Ardashev (2001) indicate, not only is terrorism more 
prevalent in cities than in rural areas, but also the number of incidents and the magnitude of 
the physical damage created by terrorism in urban areas has increased steadily in recent 
years. Savitch and Ardashev (2001) provide four main reasons that cities are selected by 
terrorists for their attacks. First, cities represent what in military terms are called “target-rich 
environments”. They contain a high density and a heterogeneous mix of valuable assets, 
including numerous human targets and large infrastructures. Second, global economic 
interdependence hinges on the role that cities play as communication nodes and command 
centers. Third, the high population density and heterogeneity that is characteristic of urban 
areas often implies that antagonistic groups are located in close geographic proximity. As a 
result, some cities have become nesting grounds for terrorist organizations. Savitch and 
Ardashev (2001) mention Beirut and Belfast among other examples of this phenomenon. 
Finally, cities have substantial symbolic value as terrorist targets. 
In addition to the four explanations offered by Savitch and Ardashev (2001) for why 
cities are preferred targets for terrorism, it should be pointed out that cities might be 
particularly vulnerable to terrorist actions. The large number of individuals and goods  
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traveling into cities often makes security measures too costly or impractical. In addition, 
cities allow terrorists to “hide in the crowd”.  
Although terrorism is not new to cities, the 9/11 attacks massively increased the 
perceived level of terrorist risk in Central Business Districts. The New York downtown 
office market was severely impacted on 9/11, with 44 percent of Manhattan’s downtown 
Class A space destroyed by the attacks, according to the City of New York (2001). The 
Government Accounting Office (2002) estimated the effects of the 9/11 attacks on New York 
City at “about $83 billion in lost output, wages, business closings, and spending reductions,” 
(Eisinger, 2004). 
Surveys of building owners and managers provide direct evidence of an increased 
perception of terrorist risk in Central Business Districts as a result of the 9/11 attacks, which 
resulted in enhanced security measures.
2 The introduction of better or additional building 
security measures in response to 9/11 led to security spending increases. Buildings Owners 
and Manager’s Association/International estimated that U.S. security spending by private 
office building owners/managers rose from 49 cents per square foot in 2001 to 55 cents per 
square foot in 2003, a 12-percent increase (Chapman, 2004). For certain trophy buildings, 
such as the Sears Tower, the increases were even more pronounced. Security costs at 
Chicago’s Sears Tower increased from 39 cents per square foot per year immediately before 
9/11 to 1.05 dollars per square foot per year afterwards.
3 In 2004 the security costs 
throughout the U.S. for Class A downtown buildings averaged to 71 cents per square foot per 
year for buildings with more than 600,000 square feet and at 59 cents per square foot per year 
regardless of the size of the building (BOMA, 2005). However, security costs were 
substantially lower for firms located outside major urban centers.
4  
It is therefore not surprising that after 9/11 many real estate market analysts expressed 
their concerns about the potential impact of an increase of terrorist risk in cities (see, e.g., 
Johnson and Kasarda, 2003, and Mills, 2002). However, apart from documented increases in 
security costs after 9/11 and beyond the direct destruction that resulted from the attacks, to 
                                                 
2 See BOMA (2003) and Laing (2003). 
3 The pre-9/11 figure is based on security costs in the Sears Tower for the period between January 1, 2001 and 
Sept. 11, 2001. The post-9/11 figure is based on security costs in the Sears Tower for the period 2002-2004. 
These figures were conveyed to us in personal communication with Carlos Villarreal, Vice President of 
National Security and Life Safety of Trizec Properties and former Director of Security of the Sears Tower.  
4 Kinum (2005) estimate that moving 15 to 20 miles outside the city can reduce security costs for a company by 
as much as 60 percent.  
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date empirical researchers have not yet detected evidence of a substantial impact of terrorism 
in cities. After analyzing historical data for cities affected by war or terrorism, Glaeser and 
Shapiro (2002) argue that while the effects of 9/11 on the lower Manhattan area are likely to 
be substantial, other urban areas in the U.S. may be largely unaffected. Based on data on 
mass transit ridership and commercial real estate trends before and immediately after 9/11, 
Dittmar and Campbell (2002) argue that the 9/11 attacks are unlikely to encourage sprawl or 
migration outside dense metropolitan areas. Harrigan and Martin (2002) reach a similar 
conclusion about the resilience of cities to terrorism.
5  
Of course, as other analysts have pointed out, the resilience of cities to terrorism 
depends on the intensity of terrorist risk. Along these lines, Mills (2002) argues that the value 
of economies of agglomeration for Central Business Districts could erode as a result of the 
9/11 attacks. Mills (2002) suggested also that rents on tall office buildings would be 
negatively affected. Johnson and Kasarda (2003) indicate that "commercial real estate 
brokers and corporate relocation consultants report that since 9/11 an increasing number of 
their clients are expressing an aversion to locating in so-called trophy properties ... and ‘run 
of the mill’ properties within the ‘shadow’ of such facilities, other large gathering venues, ... 
energy generating facilities, and infrastructure projects." Consistent with this observation, 
Dermisi (2006) reports an increase in vacancy rates after 9/11 in high-end buildings close to 
the main Chicago landmark buildings. A survey in Miller et al. (2003) showed that after 9/11 
tenants were more concerned with the profile of their co-tenants and preferred to avoid 
companies or agencies that might be possible terrorist targets. In addition, Miller et al. (2003) 
analyze data for a sample of tall and trophy buildings in 10 U.S. cities. They fail to find 
significant evidence of an impact of the 9/11 attacks, with the exception of an increase in 
sublet activity for a small set of “truly famous” trophy buildings. However, the time data 
horizon of the regressions in Miller et al. (2003) does not go beyond the fourth quarter of 
2001, only a few months after the 9/11 attacks. They caution the reader that “[t]his study is 
                                                 
5 In a related literature, Davis and Weinstein (2002) provide evidence that the Allied bombing of Japanese cities 
during World War II had only a temporary effect on the growth of Japanese cities. Brakman, Garretsen, and 
Schramm (2004) obtain similar results for the effect of the bombing of German cities during World War II on 
the size of the cities in West Germany. These authors find, however, that the growth of East German cities was 
permanently affected by the Allied bombing. Miguel and Roland (2005) obtain similar results as Davis and 
Weinstein (2002) using district level data on the intensity of U.S. bombing in Vietnam during Vietnam War.   
  6
preliminary in that the lasting effects of 9/11 will not be known until much more time has 
elapsed.”   
There are two potential explanations for the limited amount of empirical evidence of 
the effect of terrorism in cities. First, appropriate data sources to analyze the effect of 
terrorism in cities (e.g., commercial real estate databases) are expensive and difficult to 
access, which limits the amount of research in this area. Second, given the pervasiveness of 
long-term leases in office markets, as pointed out by Miller et al. (2003) and Johnson and 
Kasarda (2004), the true magnitude of the impact of terrorism can only be detected after a 
prolonged adjustment period. In particular, Johnson and Kasarda (2004) suggest that the 
effect of the 9/11 attacks on business activity in cities would not be detectable until 2004 and 
maybe later, after many long-term commercial real estate leases begin to expire.  
Notice, however, that it is not true that an increase in the perception of terrorist risk in 
densely occupied areas within Central Business Districts should necessarily reduce 
agglomeration or change the location decision of firms. The reason is that agglomeration 
economies in Central Business Districts may create substantial Ricardian rents. These rents 
may then act as a buffer when terrorist risk increases, so all the adjustment in the office real 
estate market may be done only through prices without any effect on vacancies. That is, if 
terrorists aim to maximize destruction, they will tend to attack large-agglomeration areas. 
However, large-agglomeration areas may be the most resilient to an increased perception of 
terrorist risk. Appendix B contains a simple model that illustrates this point.
6 The model 
suggests that only a large increase in the perceived risk of terrorism may affect the location 
of firms within cities. 
In addition to the impact of terrorism on commercial real estate, terrorism may affect 
cities in ways that are not explored in this article. In particular, Gautier, Siegmann, and van 
Vuuren (2006) provide evidence that the prices of residential properties in Amsterdam 
neighborhoods with sizeable Muslim communities were adversely impacted as a result of the 
murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004. Moreover, the results in Becker and Rubinstein (2004) 
suggest that terrorist attacks on buses have affected transportation choices in Israeli cities.  
                                                 
6 Alternatively, as explained in Appendix B, rents created by agglomeration economies may allow building 
owners to offset increases in terrorist risk with increases in security spending, so the location of firms is not 
affected.  Moreover, if firms’ managers differ in their perception of terrorist risk or firms have different degrees 
of vulnerability to terrorism attacks, an increase in the risk of terrorism may induce a reallocation of firms 
within cities without changing the overall degree of agglomeration.   
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3. Data Sources and Methodology 
The data for this study come from the CoStar Group.
7 The CoStar Group database is the only 
nationwide commercial real estate database reporting panel data on rents and vacancy rates at 
the building level, along with other building characteristics like location and height.
8 The 
CoStar Group database provides a “comprehensive inventory of office and industrial 
properties in 50 U.S. markets” (CoStar Group, 2006a) with data reported on a quarterly 
frequency. For this study, we used the CoStar Group data for the city of Chicago.  
  We restrict our sample to Class A and Class B office buildings within the extended 
Central Business District of Chicago.
9 The sample period of the data used in our analysis 
spans from the second quarter of 1996 to the second quarter of 2006. We discarded from our 
dataset office buildings that were constructed, renovated, converted to condos, or demolished 
during our sample period or immediately before. We also discarded three additional 
buildings for other miscellaneous reasons.
10 Our final dataset is a balanced panel with a total 
of 242 individual buildings in downtown Chicago. 
We classify each building in our dataset into one of two categories depending on 
whether or not the building is located in the “shadow areas” of the three main Chicago 
landmark buildings: the Aon Center, the Hancock Center, and the Sears Tower. Shadow 
areas are defined as the areas of 0.3-mile radius surrounding any of the three Chicago 
landmark buildings. Figure 1 shows the location of all Class A and Class B buildings in our 
dataset along with the three landmark building shadow areas.  
The Sears Tower, the Aon Center and the Hancock Center are among the tallest 
buildings in the U.S. Two of them, the Sears Tower and the Aon Center, are almost 
exclusively office buildings with a small retail component. In contrast, the Hancock Center 
includes a significant residential component. The Sears Tower (1,451feet and 110 floors) is 
the tallest building in the U.S., the Aon Center (1,136 feet and 83 floors) is the third tallest in 
                                                 
7 Access to the CoStar Group database was provided to us by the Building Owners and Managers Association 
(BOMA) of Chicago. 
8 As discussed below, data on rents reflect only asking rents for available office space, rather than average rent. 
9 More concretely, the study area focuses on the extended Central Business District (CBD) of Chicago with the 
following borders: Division Street (North), Ashland Avenue (West), Roosevelt Road (South) and the Lake 
Michigan (East). 
10 The first one of them seems to be totally vacant during most of the sample period due to litigations. The 
second one becomes owner-occupied during our sample period. Finally, the third of these three office buildings 
was converted to retail space in 2006.   
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the U.S., and the Hancock Center (1,127 feet and 100 floors) is the fourth tallest in the U.S. 
The three buildings belong to different real estate submarkets within the downtown area of 
Chicago (as defined by the CoStar Group). More specifically, the Sears Tower is located in 
the West Loop submarket, the Aon Center is part of the East Loop submarket, and the 
Hancock Center is part of the Michigan Avenue submarket. Our study area, however, 
expands beyond these three submarkets and includes six additional CoStar Group 
submarkets: Central Loop, South Loop, LaSalle Street, River North, River West and Gold 
Coast.  
The choice of a 0.3-mile radius to define the extent of the shadow areas was motivated 
by the extent of the debris fields caused by the collapse of the World Trade Center on 9/11.
11 
The Sears Tower’s shadow area includes 17 Class A buildings and 23 Class B buildings. The 
Aon Center’s shadow area includes 7 Class A buildings and 4 Class B buildings. Finally, the 
Hancock Center’s shadow area includes 5 Class A and 10 Class B buildings. Beyond the 
shadow areas of the three trophy buildings, our data set includes 23 Class A buildings and 
153 Class B buildings. In total, our study uses data on 52 Class A buildings and 190 Class B 
buildings. 
Our building dataset includes the following CoStar Group variables, among others: 
latitude, longitude, building height, rentable building area, submarket, vacancy rates, and 
gross rents. Gross rents are expressed in current values and they reflect asking rents for office 
space currently marketed for lease. We use the Harversine formula and data on the latitude 
and longitude of each building to calculate the distances between each of the buildings in our 
sample and the trophy buildings. 
We use fixed effects estimators to study the impact of 9/11 on the shadow versus non-
shadow areas of our study. Our basic regression specification is: 
  vacancy rate (shadow post-9/11 ) it i t t i it f α ηε = ×+ + +  (1) 
where vacancy rateit  is the vacancy rate in building i  and quarter t, shadowi×post-9/11t is a 
dummy variable that takes value one if building i is located in the shadow area of a 
                                                 
11 Risk Management Solutions (2001) reports that the collapse of the World Trade Center created a massive 
debris area up to 1,300 feet (or 0.25 miles) from the World Trade Center, with thick airborne debris traveling up 
to 0.5 miles. Based on the particular characteristics of downtown Chicago, Dermisi (2006) estimates that the 
collapse of one of the three anchor buildings in downtown Chicago would produce massive debris up to a 
distance of 0.3 miles from the building.   
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landmark building and the quarter of the observation, t, is after 9/11. In other words, 
shadowi×post-9/11t takes value one if the building is located in an area that experienced a 
large increase in the perceived risk of terrorism as a result of the 9/11 attacks and the time 
period is after 9/11. The variable  t f  is a time trend, representing common shocks to the 
Chicago office markets. In particular,  t f  tries to capture the overall economic and business 
trends in Chicago’s office market during the sample period of our study. The variable  i η  
represents time-invariant building-specific characteristics for building i, which are 
potentially correlated with shadowi (such as building location or floor plan). Finally,  it ε  
represent building-specific transitory shocks. In our estimators, all observations are weighted 
using the buildings’ rentable areas. The parameter α  measures the difference between 
changes in vacancy rates experienced around 9/11 in shadow areas and changes in vacancy 
rates experienced around 9/11 in non-shadow areas.  
  Under the assumption that, in the absence of 9/11, shadow and non-shadow areas 
would have experienced similar office real estate market trends, α  allows us to detect 
whether or not the 9/11 attacks impacted the office real estate market in downtown Chicago. 
More concretely, if the 9/11 attacks eroded agglomeration economies in downtown Chicago, 
then we expect that α  is positive.  
Notice, however, that although a non-zero α  allows us to detect the influence of 9/11 
on the Chicago office real estate market, the value of α  does not necessarily identify the 
magnitude of such effect. The magnitude of α  would be inflated relative to the effect of 9/11 
in shadow areas if office tenants moved from shadow areas in Chicago to outside shadow 
areas in Chicago in response to the higher perception of terrorism threat after 9/11. However, 
such bias would only enhance the statistical power of our tests for the hypothesis of no effect. 
The reason is that, if there was substitution between shadow and non-shadow areas in 
Chicago after 9/11, the comparison of buildings inside and outside the shadow areas 
incorporates two potential effects of terrorism: the negative effects in the shadow areas and 
the positive effects through substitution outside the shadow areas. It is also possible, 
however, that α  includes an attenuation bias relative to the effect of 9/11 in shadow areas. 
That would be the case if there was little or no substitution between shadow and non-shadow 
areas in Chicago in response to the 9/11 attacks, and if the terrorist attacks had a negative  
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impact on the office real estate markets in non-shadow areas (e.g., because they affected the 
overall economic conditions). Then, α  would under-estimate the impact of the 9/11 attacks 
on the office vacancy rates at the main three Chicago landmark buildings and other nearby 
Class A and Class B buildings. However, even if the 9/11 attacks had a negative impact on 
the office real estate markets in non-shadow areas (through their effects on the overall 
economic conditions), because the increase in the perception of terrorism was arguably 
higher in the landmark building shadow areas than in the rest of Chicago, our statistical tests 
preserve power to reject the null of no effect.  
To further substantiate our results, we use a dose-response design in which the 
variable that represents a building’s exposure to a high perceived risk of terrorism is 
constructed as the interaction between a post-9/11 dummy and the distance to the closest 
anchor building: 
  vacancy rate (distance to anchor post-9/11 ) it i t t i it f α ηε =× + + + , (2) 
where distance to anchori×post-9/11t is the interaction between the distance of building i 
and the closest of the Sears Tower, the Aon Center, and Hancock Center and a binary 
variable which takes the value one after 9/11. 
  Arguably, however, the distance to the non-shadow area may be more strongly related 
to the perceived level of terrorism at any particular location after 9/11 than the distance to the 
anchor buildings. That would be the case if the distance to the anchor buildings is an 
important factor determining the level of perceived risk within shadow areas, but the 
perceived risk of terrorism does not vary much once the building is located outside the 
shadow areas. This possibility motivates the following specification:    
  vacancy rate (distance to non-shadow area post-9/11 ) it i t t i it f α ηε =× + + + , (3) 
  Finally, because tall buildings are often viewed as preferred targets of terrorist 
attacks, we estimate an alternative dose-response design in which we use buildings’ heights 
to measure the perceived level of terrorist risk:  




4. Data Analysis 
4.1. Main Results  
Figure II shows average quarterly vacancy rates in Chicago shadow and non-shadow areas 
from the second quarter of 1996 to the second quarter of 2006. The plot of these two vacancy 
series reveals that vacancy rates in shadow and non-shadow areas evolved very similarly 
before 9/11, which suggests that both were affected by the same market trends. However, a 
radically different behavior arose in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. After 9/11, vacancy rates 
experienced a large increase inside shadow areas. Outside shadow areas, vacancy rates also 
experienced an increase during the year 2002, but they stabilized and even decreased slightly 
afterwards. Remarkably, while the two series followed each other very closely before 9/11, 
after 9/11 vacancy rates were consistently higher for offices in or nearby landmark buildings. 
The pattern of the series in Figure II is therefore consistent with the hypothesis of a more 
severe impact of 9/11 in those office properties in Chicago in or nearby landmark buildings.  
  Table I reports descriptive statistics for our sample of office buildings in downtown 
Chicago. Twenty-seven percent of the buildings in our sample are located inside one of the 
three shadow areas. Relative to office buildings outside shadow areas, office buildings inside 
shadow areas tend to be of higher quality, higher height, have more stories, and larger 
rentable areas. In the first quarter of 2001 the average vacancy rate was approximately 9 
percent in shadow areas and 7 percent in non-shadow areas. However, the difference between 
these two vacancy rates was not significant at conventional test levels. In the first quarter of 
2006, more than four years after 9/11, average vacancy rates have increased to 17.4 percent 
in shadow areas and to 12.3 percent in non-shadow areas. The difference in average vacancy 
rates between shadow areas and non-shadow areas in the first quarter of 2006 was of about 5 
percentage points and statistically significant at the 5% level. These figures suggest a 
deterioration of the office real estate market in downtown Chicago during the period 2001-
2006. This deterioration is, however, more pronounced for the three main Chicago landmark 
buildings and the buildings close to them. Table I also provides descriptive statistics for rents 
in our sample of office buildings. These data should be interpreted with caution because they 
reflect average asking rents for office space that was marketed for lease at the time of the  
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observation.
12 With this qualification in mind, it is worth noticing that the difference in 
average rents per square foot between shadow area buildings and non-shadow area buildings 
narrowed considerably from $4.14 in the first quarter of 2001 to $2.31 in the first quarter to 
2006. This variation is also consistent with a deterioration of the office real estate market in 
the shadow areas, relative to the non-shadow area. 
  In order to quantify the differences observed in Figure II for the office real estate 
market in shadow and non-shadow areas around 9/11, we estimate fixed-effects models that 
control for the effects of unmeasured building-specific characteristics. Table II reports the 
estimates for our basic specifications in equations (1) to (4), along with standard errors 
clustered at the building level. Column (1) reports that around 9/11 vacancy rate increases for 
office buildings in the shadow areas of landmark buildings were 3 percentage points higher 
than for buildings outside the shadow areas. The coefficient of the interaction shadowi×post-
9/11t indicates that after the 9/11 attacks the deterioration of the real estate market was more 
severe for office buildings located inside the shadow areas, that is in areas that experienced a 
higher increase in the perceived terrorist risk.  
  In columns (2) to (4) of Table II, we use alternative variables to identify the buildings 
that experienced a large increase in perceived terrorist risk as a result of 9/11. In column (2), 
we use the distance between the buildings and the closest of the Aon Center, Hancock 
Center, and Sears Tower as a measure of the magnitude of the change in perceived risk of 
terrorism as a result of 9/11. The coefficient on the interaction (distance to anchor)i×post-
9/11t indicates that, after controlling for other building characteristics, an additional mile to 
the closest of the three anchor buildings was associated with a 6.17 percentage point lower 
change in the vacancy rate after the 9/11 attacks, on average.  
  As explained above, it can be argued that increases in the distance between a building 
and the closest of the anchor buildings are associated with reductions in terrorist risk only up 
to the point where the building is located at a safe enough distance from the anchor buildings. 
To reflect this possibility, in column (3) we use the interaction between distance to the non-
shadow area (which is, of course, equal to zero for all the buildings located outside the 
shadow areas) and a post-9/11 indicator as a measure of the magnitude of the change in 
                                                 
12 As a result, data on rents are missing for the buildings where no office space became available for lease 
during the quarter of observation. Notice also that the quality and characteristics of available office space at a 
building in different time periods may potentially experience significant changes not measured in our data.  
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terrorist risk after 9/11. Consistent with the results in the previous columns, the coefficient on 
the interaction (distance to non-shadow area)i×post-9/11t is positive and significant. This 
coefficient indicates that for buildings inside shadow areas, an additional 0.1-mile to the 
closest anchor building was associated, on average, with a 2.3 percentage point lower 
increase in the vacancy rate after the 9/11 attacks, after controlling for other building 
characteristics. 
  In column (4), building height is used as a proxy for the increase in terrorist risk after 
9/11. Regardless of their location relative to other potential targets, tall buildings are often 
perceived to be preferred targets for terrorist attracts, given the high density of personnel that 
concentrates in them. Moreover, average evacuation times are long for tall buildings, and 
therefore terrorist attacks pose a particularly severe threat for them. The coefficient on the 
interaction between height and a post-9/11 dummy is positive and significant, indicating that 
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks taller buildings experienced higher increases in vacancy rates. 
An increase of 1,000 feet in building height is associated with a 5.2 percentage point higher 
change in the vacancy rate around 9/11.   
  On the whole, the results in Table II indicate that, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, 
buildings with characteristics that caused them to be perceived as prone or vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks experienced a particularly severe deterioration in real estate market 
outcomes. These results suggest that economic activity in Central Business Districts can be 
greatly affected by changes in the perceived level of terrorism. 
 
4.2. Robustness Analysis  
In this section, we assess the validity of the results of the previous section using a variety of 
methods.  
First, given the long term nature of lease contracts in office real estate markets, if 
changes in the perceived levels of terrorism after 9/11 affected the location decision of office 
tenants in downtown Chicago, this effect could not be instantaneous but cumulative in time 
(see, e.g., Johnson and Kasarda, 2003). Table III tests this implication of the widespread use 
of long-term leases on the timing of the effect of terrorism in the office real estate market. 
The first column of Table III reports the estimated coefficients for the following fixed-effects 
model:   
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vacancy rate (shadow post-9/11 )
(shadow quarters since 9/11 ) .
it i t




+× + + +
 (5) 
The coefficient on the interaction between the shadow area dummy and the number of 
quarters since 9/11 is positive and significant. However, once the interaction between the 
shadow area dummy and the number of quarters since 9/11 is included in the model, the 
coefficient on shadowi×post-9/11t  becomes small in absolute value and statistically non-
significant at conventional test levels. This result is consistent with our expectation that any 
real estate market reaction to an increase in the level of terrorism could not be instantaneous 
but cumulative in time. 
  The models in columns (2) to (4) are analogous to equation (5) but use the distance to 
the closest anchor building, the distance to the non-shadow area, and the height of the 
building, respectively, in place of the shadow area dummy. Again, for all these variables we 
obtain the same qualitative result as in column (1).  
Table IV provides a more detailed description of evolution of vacancy rates after 9/11 
for buildings with different degrees of exposure to terrorist risk.  Column (1) reports the 
estimated coefficients on the interactions between a shadow area dummy and time dummies 
for the years 2002 to 2006, along with clustered standard errors.  Columns (2) to (4) report 
analogous statistics for the cases in which distance to the closest anchor building, distance to 
the non-shadow area, and height of the building, respectively, are used as a proxy of 
exposure to terrorist risk after 9/11. The coefficients in Table IV shows that the gap in 
vacancy rates between buildings with different exposures to terrorist risk after 9/11 increased 
monotonically during the period 2002-2005. With the exception of the last column, where 
building height is used as a measure of exposure to terrorist risk after 9/11, Table IV 
indicates a narrowing of the gap in vacancy rates in 2006, something that can be observed 
also in Figure II. 
  As argued in more generality in Abadie (2006), the identification conditions behind 
equations (1) to (4) imply that in the absence of the 9/11 attacks, average vacancy rate trends 
in Chicago would not have differed depending on the location of the buildings relative to the 
three main landmark building or on their height. Although this assumption is not directly 
testable, it is easy to test the hypothesis that, previous to the 9/11 attacks, changes in trends in  
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the average vacancy rates did not depend on building locations with respect to the three 
anchor buildings or on the building height. To test this hypothesis, we reproduced the 
analysis of Table II using pre-9/11 data only. We divided the pre-9/11 sample into two 
roughly equal periods depending on whether the observation is before or after the last quarter 
of 1998. Then we proceeded as in Table II but using an after-1998 dummy in place of the 
post-9/11 dummy. We report the result in Table V. None of the coefficients in Table V is 
statistically significant at conventional test levels. Table V provides evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that, at least previous to 9/11, trends in vacancy rates did not depend on our proxy 
variables for the severity of the increase in terrorist risk at the building level after 9/11.
13 
    As an additional robustness check, we applied a simple permutation test of 
significance of the coefficients in Table II. To implement this test, we produced 10,000 
random permutations of the values of our measures of post-9/11 exposure to terrorism and 
recomputed the estimators of Table II for each permutation. We then compared the 
coefficients obtained in Table II to their permutation distribution. This inferential procedure 
produces exact test levels regardless of the sample size and the covariance structure of the 
regression errors,  it ε .
14 Figure III shows the permutation distributions of the coefficients on 
the interactions between our four proxies of the severity of terrorist risk after 9/11 and a post-
9/11 dummy, along with one-sided p-values. Figure III demonstrates that there is only a 
small probability (p-value) of obtaining results like those in Table II, if we permute at 
random our proxy measures of exposure to terrorist risk after 9/11 among the buildings in the 
sample. 
  As a final empirical check of the meaning of our empirical results we plot in Figure 
IV, the total rentable building area in shadow and non-shadow areas during our sample 
period.
15 Some of the results of this article could have arisen artificially if the post-9/11 
period happened to coincide with a larger increase in the supply of office space in shadow 
areas than in non-shadow areas. On the contrary, Figure IV shows that in the post-9/11 
                                                 
13 Notice that we do not fail to reject significance of the coefficients in Table V because of a large loss of 
statistical power relative to Table II. In fact, the standard errors are very similar in both tables. The coefficients 
of Table V, however, are small relative to the corresponding coefficients in Table II.   
14 In particular, this test is robust to the presence of spatial correlation between the regression errors. 
15 We computed total rentable areas for shadow and non-shadow areas using all the office buildings in the 
CoStar database of Class A and Class B office buildings in the extended Chicago downtown area (as defined 
above).  
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The results of this study suggest that the 9/11 attacks created centrifugal forces that 
influenced the location decision of high-end office tenants in downtown Chicago. We use the 
panel data structure of our dataset to eliminate the potential confounding effects that 
unmeasured building characteristics and common shocks to the Chicago office real estate 
market may have had in our analysis. We show that vacancy rates increased in Class A and B 
office buildings in Chicago after the 9/11 attacks. Moreover, we show that these increases 
were more severe for office properties located in or nearby landmark buildings that are 
considered preferred targets for terrorist attacks. In addition, we demonstrate that our results 
are remarkably robust to an extensive set of alternative specifications.  
The results of this article are particularly unsettling, given the critical role that the 
economic literature assigns to agglomeration economies in cities as a motor of economic 
growth. On the bright side, our analysis focuses on a period during which the perceived 
threat of terrorism in Central Business Districts has been particularly elevated. The results in 
Davis and Weinstein (2002), Glaeser and Shapiro (2002), Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm 
(2004) and Miguel and Roland (2005) suggest that if the perception of terrorist risk in cities 
were to return to the pre-9/11 levels, the long-run growth of cities would not be affected by 
the 9/11 attacks.  
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Appendix A: Building Class Definitions in the CoStar Database (CoStar, 2006b) 
 
Class A: A classification used to describe buildings that generally qualify as extremely 
desirable investment-grade properties and command the highest rents or sale prices compared 
to other buildings in the same market. Such buildings are well located and provide efficient 
tenant layouts as well as high quality, and in some buildings, one-of-a-kind floor plans. They 
can be an architectural or historical landmark designed by prominent architects. These 
buildings contain a modern mechanical system, and have above-average maintenance and 
management as well as the best quality materials and workmanship in their trim and interior 
fittings. They are generally the most attractive and eagerly sought by investors willing to pay 
a premium for quality. 
 
Class B: A classification used to describe buildings that generally qualify as a more 
speculative investment, and as such, command lower rents or sale prices compared to Class 
A properties. Such buildings offer utilitarian space without special attractions, and have 
ordinary design, if new or fairly new; good to excellent design if an older non-landmark 
building. These buildings typically have average to good maintenance, management and 
tenants. They are less appealing to tenants than Class A properties, and may be deficient in a 
number of respects including floor plans, condition and facilities. They lack prestige and 
must depend chiefly on a lower price to attract tenants and investors. 
 
Class C: A classification used to describe buildings that generally qualify as no-frills, older 
buildings that offer basic space and command lower rents or sale prices compared to other 
buildings in the same market. Such buildings typically have below-average maintenance and 
management, and could have mixed or low tenant prestige, inferior elevators, and/or 
mechanical/electrical systems. These buildings lack prestige and must depend chiefly on a 
lower price to attract tenants and investors.  
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Appendix B: Terrorism in a Simple Ricardian Model of Agglomeration 
 
Suppose there is a continuum of firms with mass equal to one. Firms choose location,  x, on 
the real line. The density of firms at location x is denoted by  () f x . Location  x has 
maximum capacity  () fx, so  () () fx fx ≤ . The envelope function  () fx is positive, 
symmetric, unimodal, quasi-concave, and  () 1 fxd x > ∫ . Without loss of generality, assume 
that  () fx has mode equal to zero (otherwise transform location to x µ − , where µ  is the 
mode of  () fx). Let 
(, ) () ( ) A x f Kzf xz d z =− ∫\  
measure the agglomeration of firms around location  x when the density of firms is given by 
() f x . We assume that K  is positive, quasi-concave, symmetric around its mode at zero, and 
() 1 Kzd z = ∫\ . Firms’ production function is  (, ) ((, ) ) y x fg Axf = , with  '0 g > . That is, a 
firm’s output increases with the agglomeration of firms around its location. Firms pay real 
estate rents  () rx. There is a minimum rent,  0 r , given by occupancy costs, so  0 () rx r ≥ .
16 
Firms maximize profits and building owners maximize rents. In the absence of terrorism, 
profits for a firm located at  x are given by  
() ((, ) ) () x g Axf rx π = − . 
 Let  m  be such that  () 1
m
m f xd x
− = ∫ . Consider the maximum agglomeration 
configuration, 
* f , where all firms concentrate in the interval [, ] mm − , as close as possible to 
the point of maximal capacity. Let 
** *
0 ( ) ( ( ( , )) ( ( , ))) rx r g A x f g A m f =+ − . Assume that 
*
0 ((, ) ) 0 . gAmf r −≥ Then, the pair 
** (,) f r  constitutes an equilibrium: no firm or building 
owner benefits from deviation. Owners of buildings located in the interval [, ] mm −  receive 
Ricardian rents equal to 
** *
0 () ((, ) ) ((, ) ) rx r g Axfg Amf −= − : the difference between the 
                                                 
16 In a more realistic dynamic setting, occupancy costs can be substantial as they incorporate the continuation 
values of vacancies in an environment with long-term contracts under uncertainty.    
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real estate rents and the minimum rent necessary to elicit supply of building space. Figure A.I 
portrays this equilibrium. 
  We now introduce terrorism into this model. To simplify the exposition, we assume 
that a terrorist attack imposes a cost c to all firms in and area of radius h around the location 
of the attack. We assume that hm < , so a terrorist attack cannot affect all firms in the 
maximum agglomeration equilibrium. Terrorists can produce one attack with probability 
equal to λ . We assume that terrorists maximize the costs induced by their attacks. 
  Consider the conditions under which the maximum agglomeration configuration can 
be maintained in equilibrium. If firms are located following the maximum agglomeration 
configuration (and in the absence of location-specific security measures), then terrorists will 
always attack the center of the distribution of firms. The maximum agglomeration 
configuration can be sustained in equilibrium if there exists a rent structure,  0 () rx r ≥ , such 
that for all  [, ] xh h ∈−  and all  [, ] z mm ∉− : 
** ((, ) ) () ((, ) ) () . g Axf rx c g Azf rz λ −− ≥ − 
In other words, to sustain the maximum agglomeration equilibrium, we need a rent structure 
under which firms located in the interval of \  potentially affected by a terrorist attack would 
not benefit from moving. It is easy to see that if the maximum agglomeration configuration 
can be sustained in equilibrium, then it can be sustained in an equilibrium with  0 () rx r =  for 
all  [, ] xm m ∉− . In addition, notice that
** (, ) ( , ) A m f Az f > , for all  [, ] z mm ∉− . Therefore, 
the maximum agglomeration configuration can sustained in equilibrium if there exists a rent 
structure,  0 () rx r ≥ , such that for all  [, ] xh h ∈ − : 
**






() ((, ) ) ((, ) )
() .







That is, building owners have to completely compensate tenants for the expected loss due to 
terrorism,  c λ , in order to preserve the equilibrium. This compensation is possible as long as  
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it does not violate the participation constraint of building owners,  0 () rx r ≥ . The maximum 
agglomeration configuration can be preserved in equilibrium if  
** ( ( , )) ( ( , )), c g Axfg Amf λ ≤−  
for all  [, ] xh h ∈− . That is, the maximum agglomeration configuration can be preserved in 
equilibrium if the terrorism threat is small relative to the difference in the gain from 
agglomeration economies between the firms that are threatened by terrorism and the marginal 
firms located at the periphery, m . This simple model suggests that a small increase in the 
perception of terrorism in Central Business Districts may only affect rents, without an 
increase in vacancies. In this model, vacancies may be affected only when the increase in the 
perception of terrorism is large.  
  Moreover, the real estate market may react to an increased threat of terrorism in ways 
different than a reduction in rents and still preserve the maximum agglomeration equilibrium. 
In particular, building owners may decide to invest in security if λ  or c can be reduced by 
security spending, s.  If the product  c λ  is a decreasing and convex function of s, terrorism 
will increase security spending up to the point where the derivative of  c λ  with respect to s 
is equal to minus one. If it is possible to induce a large reduction in  c λ  via security spending 
before the derivative of  c λ  with respect to s becomes larger than minus one, terrorism may 
not have a large effect on real estate market rents. Alternatively, if different firm managers 
have different perceptions of the probability of a terrorist attack, λ , or if there is 
heterogeneity across firms in the costs that a terrorist attack imposes, c, firm locations may 




Chicago’s Central Business District Office Buildings and Shadow Areas  
Crosses represent all Class A and Class B office buildings in Chicago’s Central Business District. 
Shaded circles represent 0.3-mile radius “shadow areas” surrounding the three main Chicago 




















































































































































































































TABLE I  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 














Characteristics of the buildings:      




   
Class A (=1 if Class A building, =0 

















































Vacancy rates (fraction):      




















Rent per square foot (current USD):      




















       
Number of buildings in the sample  242 66 176   
Note: Columns (1) to (3) report sample means, with the standard deviations in brackets. Column (4) reports the 
difference between columns (2) and (3), along with the standard deviation for the difference in parentheses. The 
sample is a balanced panel of Class A and Class B office buildings in the extended Chicago Central Business District 
between the second quarter of 1996 and the second quarter of 2006. See text of the article for the exact limits of the 
area of the City of Chicago included in our sample. Vacancy rates and rents are weighted by the rentable area of the 
buildings. Rent figures reflect asking rents for office building space available at the time of the survey. Data on rents 
for the first quarter of 2001 are available for 54 buildings inside the shadow areas and 80 buildings outside the 
shadow areas. Data on rents for the first quarter of 2006 are available for 55 buildings inside the shadow areas and 97 
buildings outside the shadow areas. 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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TABLE II  
9/11 AND VACANCY RATES IN DOWNTOWN CHICAGO OFFICE BUILDINGS  
(Fixed-effects estimates with clustered standard errors, 1996-2006) 
 
Dependent variable: Building vacancy rate 













distance to non-shadow area×post-9/11 
 





    .0052** 
(.0022) 
      
R-squared
  .39 .39 .39  .39 
Number of observations  9,922 9,922 9,922 9,922 
Note: The sample is a quarterly panel of Class A and Class B office buildings in the extended Chicago 
Central Business District between the second quarter of 1996 and the second quarter of 2006. See text 
of the article for the exact limits of the area of the City of Chicago included in our sample. Observations 
are weighted by the rentable area of the buildings. All specifications include building fixed effects and a 
full set of year×quarter dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the building level. 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 





TABLE III  
TIME SINCE 9/11 AND VACANCY RATES IN DOWNTOWN CHICAGO OFFICE BUILDINGS  
(Fixed-effects estimates with clustered standard errors, 1996-2006) 
 
Dependent variable: Building vacancy rate 













      










      
distance to non-shadow area×post-9/11 
 
   .0614 
(.0639) 
 
distance to non-shadow area×quarters 
since 9/11 
   .0178** 
(.0060) 
 
      
height×post-9/11 
 
    -.0003 
(.0022) 
height×quarters since 9/11 
 
    .0006** 
(.0002) 
      
R-squared
  .39 .39 .39  .39 
Number of observations  9,922 9,922 9,922 9,922 
Note: The sample is a quarterly panel of Class A and Class B office buildings in the extended Chicago 
Central Business District between the second quarter of 1996 and the second quarter of 2006. See text 
of the article for the exact limits of the area of the City of Chicago included in our sample. Observations 
are weighted by the rentable area of the buildings. All specifications include building fixed effects and a 
full set of year×quarter dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the building level. 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 













TABLE IV  
POST-9/11 YEARS AND VACANCY RATES IN DOWNTOWN CHICAGO OFFICE BUILDINGS  
(Fixed-effects estimates with clustered standard errors, 1996-2006) 
 
Dependent variable: Building vacancy rate 
 
 






























































      
R-squared
  .39 .39 .39  .39 
Number of observations  9,922 9,922 9,922 9,922 
Note: The sample is a quarterly panel of Class A and Class B office buildings in the extended Chicago 
Central Business District between the second quarter of 1996 and the second quarter of 2006. See text 
of the article for the exact limits of the area of the City of Chicago included in our sample. Observations 
are weighted by the rentable area of the buildings. All specifications include building fixed effects and a 
full set of year×quarter dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the building level. 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 




TABLE V  
REGRESSIONS USING PRE-9/11 DATA ONLY   
(Fixed-effects estimates with clustered standard errors, 1996-2001) 
 
Dependent variable: Building vacancy rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 







      





      
distance to non-shadow area×after 1998 
 
   .1017 
(.0839) 
 
      
height×after 1998 
 
    .0026 
(.0025) 
      
R-squared
  .48 .48 .48  .48 
Number of observations  5,324 5,324 5,324 5,324 
Note: The sample is a quarterly panel of Class A and Class B office buildings in the extended Chicago 
Central Business District between the second quarter of 1996 and the third quarter of 2001. See text of 
the article for the exact limits of the area of the City of Chicago included in our sample. Observations 
are weighted by the rentable area of the buildings. All specifications include building fixed effects and a 
full set of year×quarter dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the building level. 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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